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Abstract- Spin-Transfer Torque RAM (STTRAM) is 
promising for cache applications. However, it brings new data 
security issues that were absent in volatile memory 
counterparts such as Static RAM (SRAM) and embedded 
Dynamic RAM (eDRAM). This is primarily due to the 
fundamental dependency of this memory technology on 
ambient parameters such as magnetic field and temperature 
that can be exploited to tamper with the stored data. In this 
paper we propose three techniques to enable error free 
computation without stalling the system, (a) stalling where the 
system is halted during attack; (b) cache bypass during 
gradually ramping attack where the last level cache (LLC) is 
bypassed and the upper level caches interact directly with the 
main memory; and, (c) checkpointing along with bypass 
during sudden attack where the processor states are saved 
periodically and the LLC is written back at regular intervals. 
During attack the system goes back to the last checkpoint and 
the computation continues with bypassed cache. We 
performed simulation for different duration and frequency of 
attack on SPLASH benchmark suite and the results show an 
average of 8% degradation in IPC for a one-time attack 
lasting for 50% of the execution time. The energy overhead is 
2% for an attack lasting for the entire duration of execution.  
Keywords- Data security, magnetic attack, STTRAM, cache 
bypass, checkpointing. 
I. Introduction 
Spin-Transfer Torque RAM (STTRAM) [1] is promising for 
Last Level Cache (LLC) due to numerous benefits such as 
high-density, non-volatility, high-speed, low-power and 
CMOS compatibility. Fig. 1 shows the STTRAM cell 
schematic with Magnetic Tunnel Junction (MTJ) as the 
storage element. The MTJ contains a free and a pinned 
magnetic layer. The resistance of the MTJ stack is high (low) 
if free layer magnetic orientation is anti-parallel (parallel) 
compared to the fixed layer. The MTJ can be toggled from 
parallel to anti-parallel (or vice versa) by injecting current 
from source-line to bitline (or vice versa). The data in MTJ is 
stored in the form of magnetization. The data stored is ‘1’ if 
the free layer magnetization is anti-parallel to fixed layer 
magnetization and ‘0’ if they are parallel. The read/write 
latency of MTJ depends on the size of the device, current 
passing through the layers as well as on process variation. 
The free layer of MTJ flips under the influence of external 
magnetic field which can be exploited by the adversary to 
launch magnetic attacks. The magnetic field produced by a 
horseshoe magnet can be used to flip the weak bits in a 
STTRAM memory array resulting in scrambling of stored 
data [2]. The switching process and retention time of MTJ is 
highly sensitive to temperature. The retention time of MTJ 
reduces at high temperature and the bits start to flip randomly 
under the influence of thermal noise. Therefore, magnetic 
field and temperature can be exploited by the adversary to 
scramble the data in LLC to launch denial of service (DoS) 
attack or simply increase the miss rate affecting the overall 
performance of the system. The existing countermeasures to 
mitigate magnetic attack include variable strength error 
correcting code (ECC) and forced retention [2]. The strength 
of the ECC is increased (1bit/2bit/4bit/8bit) depending on the 
magnitude of the attack. The ECC design is modular and 
during normal operation the unused ECC modules are power 
gated to reduce energy. Although effective ECC introduces 
significant design overhead. The effect of temperature on the 
read/write current, latency and bit error rate is presented in [3] 
however mitigation technique is not provided.    
In this paper we consider two types of magnetic attack on 
STTRAM LLC. In the first case the strength of the attack 
ramps up gradually and in the second case we assume a 
         
Fig. 1 Schematic of STTRAM bitcell showing MTJ. 
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Fig. 2 Proposed mitigation techniques for, (a) gradually ramping 
attack; and, (b) sudden attack. Both techniques can be combined 
together for greater resilience towards attack. 
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sudden rise in attack strength. The gradual ramping attack is 
applicable to attacks launched by bringing a permanent 
magnet or electromagnet in close proximity to the memory 
manually. The sudden attack applies to scenarios where the 
adversary has precise control over parameters such as 
magnetic field strength and distance from the chip. If the 
detected attack strength is beyond the threshold where the 
functional bits fail it is assumed to be a sudden attack. The 
attack signal is generated by the sensors [2] distributed across 
the memory array. The sensors are composed of MTJ cells 
which are designed to be less robust than the actual functional 
bits. The sensor MTJs [2] can sense both gradually ramping 
attack as well as sudden attack through fail rate. Based on the 
sensor input we propose a suite of techniques to deal with the 
attack. A simple stalling is proposed where the execution of 
instructions is stalled during the ramping attack and the 
execution resumes from the same state after the attack is 
removed. Write back of dirty data is performed before stalling 
to make the processor state updated. The LLC is invalidated 
before resuming the execution to avoid reading of any 
corrupted data. Cache bypassing is proposed to continue 
error-free computation during the ramping attack (Fig. 2(a)). 
The attack sensors detect the attack ahead of time and the 
system is prepared to enable bypassing. The system needs to 
write back the dirty data in case of write-back policy to save 
the modifications made before the attack. Write back 
consumes some clock cycles before the system can continue 
with the LLC bypassing. This step is shown in the figure as 
preparing for bypass. After the write-back the bypassing is 
enabled and the system runs at lower performance due to long 
memory latency. In ramping attack the sensors sense the 
attack ahead of time to perform the write back but in case of 
a sudden attack there is no opportunity to write back the dirty 
data as the functional bits start failing instantly (Fig. 2(b)). We 
propose checkpointing technique where CPU register values 
and program counter (PC) are saved in a non-volatile memory 
and write back is performed on all cache levels. In the event 
of an attack the processor states are loaded with the last saved 
checkpointed data and the pipeline is flushed. The instructions 
executed between the last checkpoint and detection of attack 
are re-executed (Fig. 2(b)). The LLC is bypassed during the 
attack to prevent functional failures. Once the attack is 
removed the LLC is invalidated and the bypass signal is de-
asserted. The system continues to perform checkpointing at 
regular intervals. 
Related work and contributions: Cache bypassing has been 
proposed previously to increase the performance and effective 
capacity of LLC without incurring power/area costs of a larger 
sized cache. The idea is to bypass the blocks which may 
pollute the cache [4][5]. A significant number of items 
referenced in a program are accessed very rarely and when 
they are fetched in cache they evict other cache blocks. In 
such cases not only it nullifies the benefit in placing those 
items in cache but it also incurs eviction overhead of blocks 
(which may be one of the frequently accessed blocks) to make 
way for these not so frequently accessed blocks. Furthermore, 
since the data is fetched from the main memory in block sizes 
(512KB/1024KB), fetching one word leads to the eviction of 
entire cache line. In such scenarios the best option is to bypass 
the cache and directly send the requested word to CPU. Intel’s 
i860 processor provides support for cache bypassing [6]. A 
load instruction PFLD (pipelined floating-point load) is 
provided to bypass the LLC to avoid cache pollution. Cache 
bypassing is proposed for STTRAM LLC since the latency of 
write operations is 2X higher than read operations which may 
obstruct other cache accesses on a multi-core system running 
multiple processes. Therefore, other accesses can be 
forwarded to the main memory or upper level caches [7]. 
Similarly, the reusability of cache blocks is very low in 
GPGPU applications where cache bypassing results is higher 
performance [8]. 
Note that the existing bypass techniques are one-way, i.e., 
they bypass the data coming from main memory to LLC. The 
data coming from CPU to LLC is not bypassed. Therefore 
these techniques cannot be extended for data security. Other 
factors which require a new bypass architecture for security 
are as follows: (a) Bypassing of both ways is required because 
the LLC under attack is not safe to read as well as write new 
data; (b) Bypassing needs to be dynamically enabled and 
disabled depending on attack signal from sensors; and, (c) 
Before starting bypassing the dirty blocks in LLC should be 
written back to memory and after the bypass ends the LLC 
should be invalidated. 
In this paper we propose a LLC bypass architecture which 
meets the above requirements and skips all the traffic to LLC, 
both from upper level cache and main memory seamlessly 
under attack. Although promising the LLC bypassing cannot 
handle sudden attacks. This is true because entering the 
bypass mode takes several cycles which is unavailable during 
sudden attack. We propose checkpointing to ensure that the 
system saves its state periodically. This enables us to enter the 
bypass mode with previously saved state during attack. 
System-level checkpointing is a mechanism used in modern 
systems to provide recovery in case of sudden power failure 
[9]. Micro-architectural checkpointing is also proposed for 
system recovery from transient faults [10]. The basic 
approach is to perform computations in epochs during which 
the underlying hardware is checked for errors, if any fault is 
detected the results of that epoch is discarded and the system 
is restored to last known good state. During an epoch the 
results are held in a speculative state and get committed at the 
time of checkpointing. System-level state checkpointing has 
been employed to improve the performance of reorder buffer 
(ROB) in terms of handling exceptions [11]. Application level 
self-checkpointing techniques also exists [12]. The proposed 
checkpointing mechanism in this paper has been adopted from 
[10]. Since checkpointing is associated with IPC and energy 
overhead, the frequency of checkpointing could be tuned 
according to attack frequency. Initially, the checkpointing can 
be performed at larger intervals and on detection of attack the 
frequency of checkpointing can be increased. Note that the 
proposed bypassing technique can also be extended for 
thermal attack (using temperature sensors) or even for 
situations when the temperature of the LLC increases due to 
ambient conditions.  
To the best of our knowledge this is the first effort towards 
protecting data security from non-invasive tampering on LLC 
using micro-architectural features. Although we focus on the 
LLC the proposed techniques can also be extended for non-
volatile main memory. In summary, we make following 
contributions in this paper: 
 We propose CPU stalling technique to handle ramping 
attack with least design complexity. 
 We propose a novel dynamic LLC bypassing technique 
which exploits the existing design features to enable safe 
computing seamlessly under ramping attack.  
 The LLC bypass incurs a maximum IPC overhead of 40% 
when attack persists throughout the program execution 
and 15% when attack occurs only once for half the 
duration. 
 We propose checkpointing with LLC bypass to handle 
sudden attacks on LLC. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we 
describe the STTRAM attack models. The bypassing 
architecture is described in Section III. The simulation results 
are presented in Section IV. Conclusions are drawn in Section 
V. 
II. STTRAM Attack Models 
The flipping of MTJ is very sensitive to magnetic field and 
temperature. The dynamics of the MTJ free layer is described 
by the LLG equation [13]. 
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Where  ?⃗⃗?  is unit vectors representing local magnetic moment, 
𝛼  represents the Gilbert’s damping parameter, γ is 
gyromagnetic ratio, Is is spin current, G(ψ) is the transmission 
co-efficient, ℏ is reduced planck’s constant, e is charge on 
electron and 𝑒𝑝⃗⃗⃗⃗  is the unit vector along fixed layer 
magnetization. In the above expression Heff⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗ is effective field. 
The adversary can place an external AC/DC magnetic field to 
alter the Heff⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗ parameter resulting in uneven flipping during 
read/write operation [2]. The magnetic field can also be used 
to force the free layer magnetization to flip under retention [2]. 
Heating can also be used to affect the magnetization reversal 
of MTJ during read/write operation [2]. The retention time of 
MTJ is exponentially related to thermal barrier (Δ) by 𝑡 =
𝐶 ×  𝑒𝑘∆, where C and k are fitting constants. The thermal 
barrier is inversely proportional to absolute temperature (T) 
by  Δ =
𝐸
𝑘𝐵𝑇
, where E is the energy barrier and kB is the 
Boltzmann’s constant. Therefore the retention time at high 
temperature reduces and the bits start to randomly flip 
resulting in scrambling of sensitive user data. Heating the 
memory array along with external magnetic field may result 
in faster switching of MTJs. Both heating and magnetic attack 
can be carried out even when the system is OFF. But such 
attacks will not affect the computation as the cache is 
invalidated on startup. Therefore, we focus on active attacks, 
i.e. when the system is operational. 
III. Prevention Techniques 
In this section we present three countermeasures to protect 
against data security attacks on STTRAM LLC.  
A. System Assumptions  
We assume following features in the system for analysis: 
Attack sensors: We assume that the attack signal can be 
asserted by the sensors [2] before the actual bits are affected. 
Depending on the sensor error rate a signal can also be 
asserted to indicate whether the attack is gradual or sudden. 
Exclusive LLC: Exclusive cache do not store the copy of data 
already present in upper level caches. The data is guaranteed 
to be present in one of the caches. The advantage of exclusive 
cache is that they store more data. Another advantage is that 
in case of bypassing we do not need to worry about 
maintaining the inclusive property. Note that bypassing in 
inclusive LLC can also be implemented by storing the tags of 
the bypassed blocks in a buffer to maintain the inclusive 
property. The algorithm which checks the inclusiveness will 
compare the tags in all cache levels and raise an exception in 
case a tag is present in upper level cache and its copy is 
missing in LLC [4]. 
Write-no-allocate: In write-no-allocate policy the write 
misses are not loaded in the cache and the data is directly 
written to the main memory. In this policy only the reads are 
cached. We employ this policy to avoid unnecessary update 
of cache during write miss in bypass mode. 
Look-aside cache: Look aside cache architecture is a system 
where the cache is located on the processor bus in parallel 
with the main memory controller (Fig. 3). This design enables 
both the cache controller and memory controller to service 
 
 
Fig. 3 Look aside cache architecture. 
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CPU read and write requests simultaneously. If a cache miss 
occurs, then the request is completed by the memory 
controller. Fig. 3 explains the read/write operation in a look-
aside cache architecture. The CPU issues a read/write request 
and if the requested tag is found in upper level caches (L1, L2) 
then it is serviced by them. If a miss occurs in upper level 
caches (step 1), then the request is simultaneously sent to both 
LLC cache controller and main memory controller as they are 
connected to the processor bus in parallel (step 2). The cache 
controller searches the requested tag in LLC and asserts the 
HIT signal if it is found (step 3). The assertion of HIT signal 
sends an ABORT signal to the memory controller informing 
that the tag is found in LLC and the memory controller should 
abort searching in main memory. The corresponding data is 
then sent to the CPU from the LLC (step 5). If the tag is not 
found in LLC then the HIT and ABORT signals stay de-
asserted and the data is fetched by the memory controller. The 
corresponding data is sent to both CPU and LLC from the 
main memory (step 6). Therefore, the memory access time is 
reduced during LLC miss compared to traditional look-
through cache. 
B. Stalling  
The simplest and robust solution is to stall the CPU and wait 
till the attack is over. If the cache implements write-back 
policy, then the dirty data is written back to the main memory 
to save the system state on detection of the attack (for 
gradually ramping attack) and the CPU is stalled. After the 
attack is over, the entire LLC is invalidated and the 
computation starts from the last saved state. The processor’s 
register contents will remain intact and the computation can 
begin from the state it was halted. This technique is better than 
shutting down the entire system because the processor states 
remains intact and the computation can instantly start after the 
attack is over. For the user, the machine will appear to be 
stuck during the attack however the user is not required to 
reboot the system. Although simple, this technique will not 
work for sudden attack since the dirty data will be corrupted 
(or become untrustworthy). For such scenarios the processor 
has to be restarted after the attack and the applications can 
restore the states if application level checkpointing [14-15] is 
implemented (which is typically the case for common 
applications such as Microsoft word, powerpoint, firefox). 
Both of the above approaches will disable computations 
during attack and result in power loss. The attacker can also 
exploit these features to drain the battery of the system. 
C. Cache Bypass 
Cache bypassing enhances the user experience as the 
computation continues with affordable IPC degradation. We 
show the necessary steps needed to prepare for bypassing, 
continue bypassing and exit bypassing (Fig. 4(a)). If the 
sensors indicate a weak attack the LLC is flushed by copying 
the dirty data and a bypass signal (BP) is asserted. In absence 
of attack, if the bypass signal is still asserted (indicating the 
end of attack), the entire LLC is invalidated and the BP signal 
is de-asserted.  Otherwise, no extra steps are needed.  In the 
following paragraphs we explain various stages of bypassing.  
Preparing for bypassing (Fig. 4(a)): If the sensors indicate an 
attack the dirty data in LLC is copied to the main memory by 
asserting the FLUSH signal [16] in the cache controller to 
ensure correctness. Note that this is possible since the sensors 
can sense the attack ~100us ahead [2]. The FLUSH signal 
writes back the dirty blocks and invalidates all the cache lines 
after the write-back. In cases where the LLC has write-
through policy this step is not necessary as the copy of data is 
(a)  
 
(b)  
Fig. 4(a) Control flow of activating and deactivating bypassing, and 
(b) read, write request processing during bypassing.  
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Fig. 5 Bypassing of (a) read, and (b) write request with look-aside 
cache architecture. 
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immediately written back to main memory. The BP is asserted 
to indicate the cache controller to bypass the subsequent 
requests to the main memory. 
Bypassing mode (Fig. 4(b)): There are four scenarios when 
the data can leave or enter the LLC namely, read hit, read miss, 
write hit and write miss. The read hits are forcibly converted 
to read misses so that the data is read from the main memory 
instead of cache. Read misses are served normally by sending 
the data from main memory. Write hits are also forcibly 
converted to write misses and the data is written only to main 
memory (write –no-allocate). In case of write misses the main 
memory is updated with the new data. During the attack LLC 
data should not be used for computation or stored anywhere 
(upper level caches, main memory). However, new data may 
be written in the LLC during attack (to simplify design 
complexity) which will result in energy overhead but will not 
cause functional failure. In the following paragraphs we 
explain the implementation of bypass during various cache 
accesses: 
(i) LLC read hit (Fig. 5(a)): If the address requested by the 
CPU is not found in the upper level caches the request is 
forwarded to the LLC. If tag match happens in LLC and the 
corresponding valid bit is set, then the data is sent to CPU. In 
case of tag miss or invalid data in LLC the cycle is completed 
by the main memory as described earlier. To enable bypass 
we add a multiplexer and an AND gate to force a LLC miss. 
Therefore, even if the data is present in LLC the cache 
controller is tricked to send a miss signal and the data is 
fetched from main memory. The data may be overwritten in 
LLC with new data incurring energy overhead. 
ii) LLC read miss (Fig. 5(a)): If the address requested by the 
CPU is not found in any level of cache then the request is 
forwarded to memory controller and the data is read from 
main memory. A copy of the data is also placed in LLC. In 
the proposed architecture all the read requests are forced to be 
a LLC miss and each time the data is taken from the main 
memory if it is not present in upper level caches. 
iii) LLC write hit (Fig. 5(b)): If the write cycle issued by the 
CPU matches the tag in LLC then the corresponding data is 
updated. But during bypass all write requests on LLC are 
forced to be a miss and the CPU writes in main memory 
directly (assuming write-no-allocate policy). Thus, the LLC 
under attack is not updated with the new data.  
iv) LLC write miss (Fig. 5(b)): In case of LLC write miss 
when the requested address is not found the writes are 
automatically forwarded to the main memory. During bypass, 
all write requests are forced to be a miss and the main memory 
is always updated with the new data. 
Exiting bypass mode (Fig. 4(a)): If the attack ends and the 
system was not under attack then no action is needed. If the 
system was in bypass mode, then we invalidate the entire LLC 
after attack since the data cannot be trusted. After the bypass 
signal is de-asserted the subsequent requests are serviced by 
the LLC. A hardware interrupt is forced to stall the CPU and 
prevent updating of LLC during the flush and invalidate 
operations. 
C. Checkpointing 
We leverage the system-level checkpointing to mitigate the 
sudden attacks. Fig. 6 illustrates the high-level timeline of 
execution of events performed during a sudden attack. The 
CPU register values and PC are saved in a non-volatile 
memory and write back is performed on all cache levels 
during checkpointing event. When attack is sensed the system 
is restored to the last saved checkpoint and the bypass signal 
is asserted. The system continues to perform with the LLC 
bypass and the checkpointing is disabled to avoid write back 
of stale LLC data. After the attack ends the bypass signal is 
deactivated and the LLC is invalidated. The system continues 
to perform normally and the checkpointing is resumed. The 
LLC write buffers are prevented from committing the data to 
main memory between two checkpoints. If the write buffers 
are not masked, it may cause functional failures when the 
system restores to a last checkpoint. The instructions executed 
after the checkpoint should be discarded in case of roll back. 
 
Fig. 6 Cache bypass architecture with checkpointing. 
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Table 1: Processor Configuration 
Processor Alpha,O3,4 cores, 2GHz, 8-way issue 
SRAM L1-
Cache 
Private, Icache=16KB, Dcache=16KB, LRU, 64B 
cache-line, 2 cycle read/write latency, write back. 
SRAM L2 
Cache 
Private, 256KB, 8-way, LRU, 64B cache-line, 8 cycle 
read/write latency, write-back. 
LLC Cache Shared, 8MB, 4 banks, 8 ways, 8-entry write buffer 
per bank, 17cycle read latency, 34 cycle write latency, 
write-back, write no-allocate. 
 
 
 
 
But if those instructions update the LLC then the changes 
become permanent.  Thus, the LLC write buffers only write 
back at the time of checkpoint. If they are full before the 
checkpoint the processor is halted and the checkpointing is 
performed. The frequency of checkpointing is dependent on 
the size of the write buffer. This issue can also be solved by 
adding a volatile bit to each cache line which when set will 
indicate that the contents are speculative and the volatile data 
is committed during the checkpoint [10]. After the data is 
committed the volatile bits are cleared. 
IV. Simulation Results 
The proposed bypass architecture is evaluated on a 4-core 
Alpha processor in gem5 [17]. The configuration of the 
processor cores is provided in Table 1. The gem5 code is 
modified to implement: (a) variable read and write latency for 
STTRAM LLC; (b) an attack signal is added which is turned 
ON dynamically to mimic the actual attack signal from the 
sensors; and, (c) bypassing of LLC is implemented by 
modifying the cache access method to force a miss when the 
attack signal is high. The simulations are performed on a wide 
range of SPLASH benchmarks suite [18]. Two scenarios have 
been considered to calculate the loss in performance and 
energy due to the proposed bypass architecture during attack: 
(a) the attack persists for the entire duration of the simulation; 
and, (b) the attack is withdrawn after ~25%, ~50% and ~75% 
completion of each benchmark. There is no bypass for the rest 
of the time. 
Fig. 7(a) shows the instruction per cycle (IPC) for the two 
scenarios compared with the normal execution without an 
attack. In case of 100% attack the system behaves as if there 
is no LLC and thus the performance degrades by an average 
of 27% (maximum 40%). For 50% attack the performance 
degradation is 8% (average) and 15% (max) but in both cases 
the system continues computation during the attack. Fig. 7(b) 
shows the energy overhead of bypassing. In case of 100% 
attack the energy overhead is 2% (average) and 5%(max). The 
energy is calculated using the multicore power simulator 
McPAT[19] with modified CACTI [20].  
V. Conclusions 
Applicability of emerging technologies such as STTRAM in 
in memory hierarchy faces security challenges due to 
possibility of low-cost non-invasive tampering using external 
AC/DC magnetic field or temperature in order to launch 
denial-of-service attacks. We proposed three low-overhead 
solutions to mitigate these attacks: stalling, cache bypassing 
and system level checkpointing with bypassing. In case of 
gradually ramping attack we bypass the LLC and continue 
computation. For sudden attack we restore the processor to 
the last checkpointed state and continue computation with 
bypassing. The simulation results show an average of 27% 
(2%) overhead in IPC (energy) with the proposed bypass 
architecture for an attack lasting for the entire duration of 
execution. 
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Fig. 7 (a) Normalized IPC, and; (b) normalized energy for different duration of attack simulated on a Splash benchmark suite [18]. 
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